

UČNI NAČRT PREDMETA / COURSE SYLLABUS

Predmet:	Dinamika iger
Course title:	Dynamics of Games

Študijski program in stopnja Study programme and level	Študijska smer Study field	Letnik Academic year	Semester Semester
Enovit magistrski študijski program druge stopnje Predmetni učitelj	/	4	8
Five-year master's degree program Subject Teacher	/		

Vrsta predmeta / Course type	izbirni / elective
------------------------------	--------------------

Univerzitetna koda predmeta / University course code:	
---	--

Predavanja Lectures	Seminar Seminar	Vaje Tutorial	Lab. vaje Laboratory work	Terenske vaje Field work	Samost. delo Individ. work	ECTS
30		30			90	5

Nosilec predmeta / Lecturer:	Matjaž Perc
------------------------------	-------------

Jeziki / Languages:	Predavanja / Lectures: Vaje / Tutorial:	Slovenski / Slovene Slovenski / Slovene
------------------------	--	--

**Pogoji za vključitev v delo oz. za opravljanje
študijskih obveznosti:**

Osnove teorije dinamičnih sistemov in
programiranja v poljubnem jeziku.

Basic knowledge of dynamical system's theory and
programming skills in an arbitrary language.

Vsebina:

Kooperacija v različnih časovno-odvisnih
dinamičnih sistemih, Pogoji za razvoj kooperacije –
vpliv prostorske razširitve sistemov, Vplivi okolja na
kooperacijo in korupcijo; Cvetenje korupcije v
močno nepredvidljivih sistemih; Optimalna okolja
in
pogoji za kooperacijo, Vloga teorije iger.

Content (Syllabus outline):

Cooperation in different time-dependent dynamical
systems, Conditions for the evolvement of
cooperation – influences of spatial system
extensions, Influences of the environment on
cooperation and corruption, Blossoming of
corruption in heavily unpredictable systems,
Optimal environments and conditions for
cooperation, Role of

	game theory.
--	--------------

Temeljni literatura in viri / Readings:

- R. Axelrod, *The evolution of cooperation* (Basic Books, New York, 1984).
- J. Hofbauer in K. Sigmund, *Evolutionary games and population dynamics* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998).
- J. W. Weibull, *Evolutionary Game Theory* (MIT Press, Cambridge, 1995).
- J. Maynard Smith, *Evolution and the Theory of Games* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982).

Cilji in kompetence:

Študenti usvojijo ključne fizikalne mehanizme, ki so vodili do evolucije kooperacije in korupcije v moderni družbi.

Objectives and competences:

Students understand the key physical mechanisms that led to the evolution of cooperation and corruption in the modern society.

Predvideni študijski rezultati:

Znanje in razumevanje:

Poznavanje in razumevanje ključnih fizikalnih mehanizmov, ki so vodili do razvoja kooperacije in korupcije v moderni družbi.

Intended learning outcomes:

Knowledge and understanding:

Mastering and understanding of key physical mechanisms that led to the evolution of cooperation and corruption in the modern society.

Prenesljive/ključne spremnosti in drugi atributi:

Sposobnost napovedati uspeh različnih strategij v danih okoliščinah s pomočjo računalniških simulacij

Transferable/Key Skills and other attributes:

The ability to foretell the success of different strategies in a given environment by computer simulations.

Metode poučevanja in učenja:

Predavanje in individualno raziskovalno delo.

Learning and teaching methods:

Lectures and individual research work.

Delež (v %) /

Načini ocenjevanja:

Weight (in %) **Assessment:**

Način (pisni izpit, ustno izpraševanje, naloge, projekt)		Type (examination, oral, coursework, project):
Seminarska naloga	90	Written seminar work
Pisni ali ustni izpit	10	Pisni ali ustni izpit

Reference nosilca / Lecturer's references:

GOSAK, Marko, PERC, Matjaž, KRALJ, Samo. The impact of static disorder on vibrational resonance in a ferroelectric liquid crystal. *Mol. cryst. liq. cryst. (Phila. Pa. : 2003)*, 2012, vol. 553, no. 1, str. 13-20, doi: [10.1080/15421406.2011.609343](https://doi.org/10.1080/15421406.2011.609343). [COBISS.SI-ID [18878472](#)]

SZOLNOKI, Attila, PERC, Matjaž. Conditional strategies and the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games. *Phys. rev., E Stat. nonlinear soft matter phys. (Print)*, 2012, vol. 85, iss. 2, str. 026104-1-026104-7, graf. prikazi, doi: [10.1103/PhysRevE.85.026104](https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.85.026104). [COBISS.SI-ID [18940680](#)]

WANG, Zhen, SZOLNOKI, Attila, PERC, Matjaž. Percolation threshold determines the optimal population density for public cooperation. *Phys. rev., E Stat. nonlinear soft matter phys. (Print)*, 2012, vol. 85, iss. 3, str. 037101-1-037101-4, doi: [10.1103/PhysRevE.85.037101](https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.85.037101). [COBISS.SI-ID [18986248](#)]

LIU, Yongkui, CHEN, Xiaojie, ZHANG, Lin, WANG, Long, PERC, Matjaž. Win-stay-lose-learn promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. *PLoS one*, 2012, vol. 7, iss. 2, str. e30689-1-e30689-8, doi: [10.1371/journal.pone.0030689](https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0030689). [COBISS.SI-ID [18986504](#)]

PERC, Matjaž. Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders. *Scientific reports*, 2012, vol. 2, art. no. 344, 6 str., doi: [10.1038/srep00344](https://doi.org/10.1038/srep00344). [COBISS.SI-ID [19071752](#)]